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RECENT LEGISLATION
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION-STATUTORY CHANGE IN JURISDICTIONAL
AMouNT AND CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP-A recent congressional amendment
of federal district court jurisdictional requirements for both diversity of
citizenship and federal question litigation1 has raised the required amount
in controversy from $3,000 to $10,000. The trial court has also been given
discretion either to deny costs or assess them against the plaintiff if he is
finally adjudged entitled to recover less than $10,000, determined without

1

H.R. 11102, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958); 72 Stat. 415. Approved July 25, 1958.
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regard to any set-off or counterclaim and exclusive of interest and costs.2
Further, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and removal, a corporation
is now deemed a citizen "of any State by which it has been incorporated
and of the State where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C.
(Supp. V, 1958) §§1331, 1332.3
The reasoning behind enlargement of the corporate "citizenship"
concept is not entirely clear. Congress may have been primarily interested
either in reducing the district court caseload4 or in eliminating a portion
of diversity jurisdiction as an end in itself.5 Alternatively, the purpose may
have been to confine this jurisdiction to its original rationale. The raison
d'etre of diversity jurisdiction is a fear of possible state court prejudice
against out-of-state litigants.6 By settled law prior to this amendment, for
diversity purposes, a corporation was a "citizen" only of its state of incorporation.7 Thus a business incorporated in state A whose operations
were in state B was qualified to litigate a claim against a citizen of state B
in a federal court in that state. Yet where a corporation is engaged in a
substantial amount of activity in the state of the opposing litigant, it is
hardly possible that any prejudice against the corporation would exist
because of its incorporation in another state.8 Clearly, then, the present
2 This latter stipulation, designed to discourage inflated claims, will be of particular
significance in tort litigation. It is inapplicable when an express provision is otherwise
made in another federal statute. In general, the change in jurisdictional amount is expected to lessen by over 7% the number of district court civil suits. This reduction will
appear primarily in diversity cases since the only significant federal question controversies
affected, those arising under the Jones Act and those contesting the constitutionality of
state statutes, usually involve an amount in excess of $10,000. See, generally, H. Hearings
before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2516 and H.R.
4497, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1957); H. Rep. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 5 (1958).
s The amending provisions apply only to actions commenced after the date of enactment. In federal courts an action is commenced by filing the complaint. Rule 3, Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C. (1952). However, when a suit begun in a state court prior to
enactment is removed to federal court after that date, it is unclear when such suit was
"commenced" within the meaning of the amendment. Compare Lorraine Motors, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., (E.D. N.Y. 1958) 166 F. Supp. 319, with Kieffer v. Travelers
Fire Ins. Co., (D.C. Md. 1958) 27 U.S. LAW WEEK 2223.
4 Since World War II, civil cases filed in the district courts have increased 75%. Most
of this increase has been in diversity cases, and 60% of these involve corporations. H. Rep.
1706, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 2. What statistics are available indicate that the present
amendment will eliminate from 3.6% to 23.4% of corporate diversity litigation. H. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2516 and H.R.
4497, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 43 (1957).
5 Many authorities believe that the original reasons for diversity jurisdiction have
now almost disappeared, and that this jurisdiction should be radically cut down. See
Warren, "New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 37 HARV. L.
REv. 49 at 132 (1923). See, generally, Reed, "Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil
Actions," 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 483 at 519-522 (1957).
6 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304 at 347 (1816).
7 Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line, 215 U.S. 501 (1910).
s See, generally, Wechsler, "Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial
Code," 13 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 216 (1948); Doub, "Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We
Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?" 44 A.B.A.J. 243 (1958).
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extension of co1;porate "citizenship" will properly eliminate from federal
courts some of the litigation where the fear of state prejudice is unfounded.
This statutory extension of "citizenship" only to the state of the corporation's principal place of business would, however, seem to be inadequate
to eliminate all such cases. It is at least arguable that the concept should
have been further broadened to make the corporation a "citizen" of any
state in which it carries on a substantial amount of activity. The amendment may be criticized also for leaving largely undefined the meaning of
"principal place of business." Congress felt that "there is provided sufficient criteria to guide courts in future litigation under this bill" 9 since
the test has ample precedent in decisions construing other federal statutes,
notably the Bankruptcy Act.1 Cases under that act treat the question of
locating a corporation's "principal place of business" as one of fact, to be
determined by studying and balancing the circumstances of the particular
case.11 Important factors that enter into consideration include the situs
of the chief manufacturing plant, 12 the place where the business is generally
conducted,13 and the dominant purpose of the corporation.14 On the other
hand, location of board and stockholder meetings, the place where meeting records and stock transfer books are kept, and recitals that the home
office is the principal place of business are relatively unimportant. 15 But
it was early recognized that it is impossible to lay down any general rule
for determining which of several places at which a corporation does
business is its "principal" location.16 For this reason preliminary litigation
over the question of "principal place of business" may offset much of the
economy of time which should otherwise result from the likely reduction in
the federal courts' caseload.17 Since the amendment fails to restrict diversity
litigation to situations which would support its rationale and because it
leaves unsettled the meaning of the applicable test, limitation of federal
diversity jurisdiction as to corporations doing business in foreign states
may be only the weak ancestor of legislation to come.

°
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o H. Rep. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 4 (1958).
10 Bankruptcy courts are given jurisdiction over persons who, among other things,
"have had their principal place of business" within the jurisdiction for the preceding
6 months. 66 Stat. 420, 11 U.S.C. (1952) §11.
11 See, e.g., In re Pusey & Jones Co., (2d Cir. 1922) 286 F. 88, cert. den. 261 U.S. 623
(1923).
12 In re American & British Mfg. Co., (D.C. Conn. 1924) 300 F. 839; In re E. & G.
Theatre Co., (D.C. Mass. 1915) 223 F. 657.
13 Ibid.
14In re Pusey & Jones Co., note 11 supra; In re Devonian Mineral Spring Co., (D.C.
Ohio 1920) 272 F. 527.
15 See Dryden v. Ranger Refining & Pipe Line Co., (2d Cir. 1922) 280 F. 257, cert.
den. 260 U.S. 726 (1922); In re American & British Mfg. Co., note 12 supra.
16 In re Worcester Footwear Co., (D.C. Mass. 1948) 251 F. 760 at 761.
17 See note 4 supra.

